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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW -- STATUTES -- CRIMINAL LIABILITY BASED
UPON ABILITY OR DEFENDANT TO PAY FOR AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE TO
CHARGE OF ISSUING INSUFFICIENT FUNDS CHECK IS A VIOLATION OF
THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE.
Bruce Allen Fischer, an indigent,' was charged with issuing an
insufficient funds check 2 in violation of section 6-08-16 of the North
Dakota Century Code. 3 Fischer filed a motion to dismiss the charge
1. Appellant's Brief, app. at 4, State v. Fischer, 349 N.W.2d 16 (N.D. 1984).
2. State v. Fischer, 349 N.W.2d 16, 17 (N.D. 1984). Fischer issued a $100 check datedJuly 23,
1983 drawn on the Dakota Bank & Trust Company, Fargo, North Dakota, made payable to
Hornbacher's of Fargo, North Dakota. Appellant's Brief, app. at 1, Fischer.
3. 349 N.W.2d at 17. Section 6-08-16 of the North Dakota Century Code provided in pertinent
part as follows:
1. A person may not, for himself, as the agent or representative of another, or as
an officer or member of a firm, company, copartnership, or corporation make, draw,
utter, or deliver any check, draft, or order for the payment of money upon a bank,
banker, or depository, if at the time of such making, drawing, uttering, or delivery, or
at the time of presentation for payment if made within one week after the original
delivery thereof, there are not sufficient funds in or credit with the bank, banker, or
depository to meet the check, draft, or order in full upon its presentation. Violation of
this subsection is a class B misdemeanor. ...
4. A notice of dishonor must be sent by the holder of the check upon dishonor,
prior to the institution of a criminal proceeding, the notice to be in substantially the
lbllowing form:
Notice of Dishonored Check
Date
Name of Issuer
Street Address
City and State
You are according to law hereby notified that a check dated
19- drawn on the Bank
of in the amount of has been
returned unpaid with the notation the payment has been refused because of
nonsufficient funds. Within ten days from the receipt of this notice, you must pay or
tender to
(Holder)
sufficient moneys to pay such instrument in full and any collection lees or costs not in
excess often dollars. Payment to holder of the face amount of the instrument, plus any
collection fees or costs, not exceeding the additional sum often dollars, shall constitute
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alleging that section 6-08-16 of the North Dakota Century Code
created a classification based on wealth and therefore violated the
equal protection clause of the United States Constitution.4
Fischer's contention in the county court of Cass County was that
section 6-08-16 of the North Dakota Century Code unfairly
provided a defense to a defendant with the ability to pay while a
defendant lacking the ability to pay was not provided a defense. 5
The trial court agreed and granted Fischer's motion to dismiss 6 and
the State appealed.7
The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's
decision and held section 6-08-16 of the North Dakota Century
Code unconstitutional.' The court reasoned that the statute
a defense to a criminal charge brought hereunder if paid within ten days from receipt
of this notice of dishonor. If payment of the above amounts is not made within ten days
from receipt of this notice of dishonor, a civil penalty of the lesser of' one hundred
dollars or three times the amount of the instrument will be assessed.
The notice may also contain a recital of the penal provisions of this section and the
possibility of a civil action to recover any collection fees or costs or civil penalty
authorized by this section.
5. An agent acting for the receiver of a check in violation of this section may
present the check to the state's attorney for prosecution if the issuer does not pay to the
holder sufficient moneys to pay the check within ten days from receipt of the notice.
The criminal complaint for the offense of issuing a check, draft, or money order
without sufficient funds under this section must be executed within not more than
ninety days after the dishonor by the drawee of said instrument for nonsufficient
funds. The failure to execute a complaint within said time shall bar the criminal
charge under this section.
Nonsufficient Fund Check Issuance Act, ch. 116, § 1, 1983 N.D. Sess. Laws 296, 296-98 (current
version to be codified at N.D. CENT. CODE § 6-08-16 (Supp. 1985)).
4. 349 N.W.2d at 17. U.S. CONsr. amend. XIV, § 1. Section one of the fourteenth amendment
provides as follows:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they
reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
Id. (emphasis added).
5. 349 N.W.2d at 17.
6. Id. In granting Fischer's motion to dismiss, Judge Cooke relied upon the North Dakota
Supreme Court's decision in State v. Carpenter, 301 N.W.2d 106 (N.D. 1980). Fischer, 349 N.W.2d
at 17. In Carpenter the North Dakota Supreme Court ruled that § 6-08-16.2 of the North Dakota
Century Code was unconstitutional. State v. Carpenter, 301 N.W.2d 106, 110 (N.D. 1980). The
version of § 6-08-16.2 involved in Carpenter was a statute similar to § 6-08-16. See Carpenter, 301
N.W.2d at 108. Section 6-08-16.2 set forth the circumstances under which the issuance of a no-
account or an insufficient funds check was a felony. See Issuing Check With Insufficient Funds Act,
oh. 77, § 1, 1977 N.D. Sess. Laws 173, 173-74 (current version to be codified at N.D. CENT. CODE §
6-08-16.2 (Supp. 1985)). The court in Carpenter determined that § 6-08-16.2 created an impermissible
classification based upon wealth that amounted to a denial of equal protection and was therefore
constitutionally infirm. Carpenter, 301 N.W.2d at 110.
After comparing the statutes involved in Carpenter and Fischer (North Dakota Century Code § 6-
08-16.2 and 6-08-16, respectively), Judge Cooke determined that, when read together, the
differences between the two statutes were clearly procedural and not substantive; therefore "the net
result flowing from either statute is the same in that it sets forth an impermissible classificatiin
favoring the wealthy over the indigent .... This being the case. 6-08-16 must . . . be declared
constitutionally infirm." Appellant's Brief, app. at 15, Fischer.
7. Fischer, 349 N.W.2d at 17.
8. Id. at 18.
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violated the equal protection clause by creating a wealth-based
affirmative defense to criminal charges of issuing a check without
sufficient funds. 9 State v. Fischer, 349 N.W.2d 16 (N.D. 1984).
The power of the legislature to create statutory classifications
is not absolute, 10 but is limited by the fourteenth amendment's
guarantee of equal protection." In order to determine the validity
of classifications created by legislatures, the United States Supreme
Court has developed a multi-tiered approach to equal protection
analysis.12 Under this analysis, classifications created in economic
and general social welfare regulations are upheld as long as some
rational relationship exists between the classification and a
legitimate legislative purpose.13 On the other hand, legislative
classifications which are drawn along the lines of a suspect class or
which affect a fundamental interest are subjected to strict scrutiny
and upheld only if the classification is shown to be necessary to
promote a compelling state interest.' 4 Classifications which are
subject to the most recently developed intermediate standard of
review will be upheld only when the state can show that the
classification is substantially related to an important governmental
objective. 15
9. Id.
10. See Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 21 (1956) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). In recognizing
that the equal protection of the laws concept is not aimed at an abstract notion of equality, Justice
Frankfurter stated: "Nor does the equal protection of the laws deny a State the right to make
classifications in law when such classifications are rooted in reason." Id.
11. See San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 59 (1973) (Stewart, J.,
concurring). In explaining the function of section one of the fourteenth amendment, .Justice Stewart
stated that "Itihe function of the Equal Protection Clause . .. is simply to measure the validity of
classifications created by state laws." Id. (emphasis original).
12. See generally J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTtTUTIONAi LAW ch. 16 § I (2d ed.
1983) (concise historical background to the development of the three standards of review under equal
protection analysis).
13. See, e.g., Kotch v. Board of River Port Pilot Comm'rs, 330 U.S. 552 (1947). In Kotch the
Court rejected an equal protection challenge to Louisiana's pilotage laws that allegedly provided
only friends and relatives of incumbent pilots with certification. Id. at 553-56. Justice Black's opinion
for the Court found that the object of the system was to provide safety and efficiency in pilotage and
that "the benefits to morale and espirit de corps which family and neighborly tradition might
contribute" were not so unrelated to this objective as to violate the equal protection clause. Id. at
563-64.
14. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
In Shapiro the Court applied the "necessary and compelling" test to statutory provisions of
Connecticut, Pennsylvania, and the District of Columbia that denied welfare assistance to persons
who had not resided within their jurisdictions for at least one year prior to their application for
assistance. Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 634. The Court held these provisions unconstitutional as a violation
of the equal protection clause because the classification affected the fundamental right of interstate
travel. Id. at 638. In Loving the Court applied strict scrutiny to a Virginia antimiscegenation statute
and held that the racial classification contained in the statute violated the equal protection clause.
Loving, 388 U.S. at 11-12. See also Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). In Korematsu the
Court upheld the temporary exclusion and detention of persons of Japanese ancestry from the West
Coast during World War II. Id. at 219. The Court, in upholding this racial classification under strict
scrutiny, gave great deference to the findings of the military authorities who concluded that it was
impossible to immediately segregate the disloyal Japanese Americans from the loyal. Id.
15. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976). In Craig the Court struck down an Oklahoma
statute that contained a gender-based classification for the sale of 3.2% beer by applying a standard
of review different from either the rational basis or the strict scrutiny approach. Id. at 197-2 10. The
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Although the Court has suggested that indigency may be
considered a suspect classification in some instances, 16 the Court
has never held that discrimination based upon wealth, standing
alone, is enough for the Court to invoke strict scrutiny.17 However,
when a wealth classification is coupled with a right that has been
deemed "fundamental," the Court has applied strict scrutiny.18
The Court has consistently ruled that no basis exists for usipg any
standard of review greater than rational basis scrutiny when
classifications burden the poor, but involve no recognized
fundamental interests. 19 Apparently, the Court has been unwilling
to elevate wealth classifications to the point where indigency alone
would invoke strict scrutiny because poverty is not always as
permanent or irrelevant as traditional suspect classifications. 20 The
Court stated that "[tlo withstand constitutional challenge, . . . classifications by gender must serve
important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those
objectives.'" Id. at 197 (emphasis added).
16. See Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 61 (Stewart,J., concurring). Justice Stewart stated that in addition
to the prime example of a suspect classification (a classification based upon race) "there are other
classifications that, at least in some settings, are also 'suspect' - for example, those based upon...
indigency . I.. - Id. (citations omitted). Wealth classifications have been compared to other suspect
classifications when involved in a criminal trial. See Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956). In Griffin
Justice Black stated as follows:
In criminal trials a State can no more discriminate on account of poverty than on
account of religion, race, or color. Plainly the ability to pay . . . bears no rational
relationship to a defendant's guilt or innocence and could not be used as an excuse to
deprive a defendant of a fair trial.
Id. alt 17-18. He went on to state that "[t]here can be no equal justice where the kind of trial a man
gets depends on the amount of money he has." Id. at 19.
17. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 29.
18. See Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974) (right to interstate travel);
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (right to interstate travel); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of
Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (right to vote); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) (right to
fair treatment in a criminal appeal); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956) (right to fair treatment in
a criminal appeal).
19. See United States Dept. of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973) (rational basis
scrutiny used to invalidate amendment to the Food Stamp Act rendering ineligible any household
containing an individual unrelated to any other member of the household); San Antonio Indep.
School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (rational basis scrutiny used to uphold Texas school
financing system that supplemented state aid through ad valorem tax on property within the school
districts); Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U.S. 656 (1973) (Oregon's $25 appellate court filing fee, required
in order to gain appellate review of decisions of the state welfare division to reduce welfare payments,
upheld under rational basis scrutiny); United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434 (1973) (S50 filing fee
requirement involved in a voluntary petition in bankruptcy does not deny an indigent equal
protection of the laws since the.right to discharge in bankruptcy is not a "fundamental" right
demanding a compelling governmental interest and there is a rational basis for the fee requirement);
Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970) (Maryland AFDC regulation setting $250 per month
ceiling on AFDC grants regardless of the size of the family and its actual need did not violate the
equal protection clause because it was rationally related to the state's interest in encouraging
etmployment and in maintaining a balance between welfare families and families of the working
poor).
20. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 121-22 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall suggests that (1)
"It ]he poor may not be seen as politically powerless as certain discrete and insular minority groups;"(2) although "personal poverty may entail much the same social stigma as historically attached to
certain racial and ethnic groups," unlike other immutable characteristics, poverty may be overcome;
(3) "personal wealth may not share the general irrelevance as a basis for legislative action that race or
nationality is recognized to have" since social legislation must frequently take economic status into
consideration. Id.
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Court has been unwilling to impose an affirmative duty on the
states to redress economic imbalances. 2 Accordingly, the Court
has not interpreted the equal protection clause to require absolute
equality or precisely equal advantages when a statute contains a
wealth classification. 22
The primary issue that the North Dakota Supreme Court
addressed in Fischer was whether the restitution language of section
6-08-1623 violated the equal protection clause by creating an
affirmative defense to the offense of issuing a check without
sufficient funds. 24 The court noted that the trial court had relied
upon State v. Carpenter25 in granting Fischer's motion to dismiss and
recited the language of section 6-08-16.226 that had been held
unconstitutional in that case. 27
The State argued that the affirmative defense language of
section 6-08-16 involved in Fischer was distinguishable from the
language of section 6-08-16.2 found unconstitutional in Carpenter. 28
The State further claimed that the affirmative defense language of
section 6-08-16 did not constitute substantive law but was merely
an example of the required notice of dishonor. 29
21. See Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 362 (1963) (Harlan, j., dissenting) (quoting Griffin
v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 34 (1956) (Harlan,J., dissenting)). In DouglasJustice Harlan stated that laws
of general applicability that may affect the poor more- harshly than the rich do not deny equal
protection to the less fortunate because "the Equal Protection Clause does not impose on the States
'an affirmative duty to lift the handicaps flowing from differences in economic circumstances.' " Id.
Justice Harlan further stated that "[tihe State may have a moral obligation to eliminate the evils of
poverty, but it is not required by the Equal Protection Clause .. " Id. See also Griffin v. Illinois, 351
U.S. 12, 28 (1956) (Burton, J., dissenting) (stating that it may be a desirable social policy to make
defendants economically equal before the bar of justice, but what may be a good social policy is not
necessarily required under the Constitution).
22. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 24.
23. See Nonsufficient Fund Check Issuance Act, ch. 116, § 1, 1983 N.D. Sess. Laws 296, 296-98(current version to be codified at N.D. CENT. CODE § 6-08-16 (Supp. 1985)). Section 6-08-16(4)
provided in pertinent part as follows: "Payment to holder of the face amount of the instrument, plus any
collection fees or costs, not exceeding the additional sum of ten dollars, shall constitute a defense to a
criminal charge brought hereunder if paid within ten days from receipt of this notice of dishonor."
Id. (emphasis added).
24. Fischer, 349 N.W.2d at 17.
25. 301 N.W.2d 106 (N.D. 1980). In Carpenter the court ruled that a statute providing for an
affirmative defense to a felony charge of issuing an insufficient funds or no-account check was
unconstitutional because it created an impermissible classification based upon wealth and therefore
was a violation of the equal protection clause. Id. at 110. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
26. Issuing Check With Insufficient Funds Act, ch. 77, S 1, 1977 N.D. Sess. Laws 173, 173-74(current version to be codified at N.D. CENT. CODE 5 6-08-16.2 (Supp. 1985)). The text of the statute
that violated the equal protection clause in Carpenter provided in pertinent part as follows: "However,
if the drawer pays the holder of the instrument within thirty days after receiving written notice of non-
payment' . . . that fact shall constitute an affirmative defense to a criminal prosecution under this
section." Id. (emphasis added).
27. Fischer, 349 N.W.2d at 17.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 17-18. The State argued that if, under the basic rules of statutory construction, a
statute can be interpreted in two ways, one of which is constitutional and one unconstitutional, the
statute should be read in the manner in which it is constitutional. Appellant's Brief at 11-12, Fischer.
The State suggested that, although reading the statute in such a manner resulted in a strained
construction, the statute must be read that way if it is the only manner in which the statute is
constitutional. Id. The State further argued that construing the payment defense language of 5 6-08-
16(4) as part of the preceeding example of the notice of dishonor would render § 6-08-16
constitutionally valid; therefore, that construction was the one the court must accept. Id. at 12.
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The court disagreed with the State and found that the location
of the wealth classification language within the subsection
prescribing the form for the required notice of dishonor was
unimportant. 30 The court further determined that the relevant
language in section 6-08-16 was substantially identical to the
language of section 6-08-16.2.31 The court ruled that, like the
language in Carpenter, section 6-08-16 created a classification based
upon wealth in violation of the equal protection clause and was
therefore unconstitutional. 32
The court in Fischer based its holding upon its prior decision in
Carpenter with no additional analysis of the constitutional issue
presented. 33 Therefore, the Fischer court's decision can be analyzed
only by considering the rationale of the Carpenter decision.
In order to begin its analysis of the constitutional validity of
section 6-08-16.2 in Carpenter, the North Dakota Supreme Court
looked to the nature of the wealth classification involved. 34 The
court noted that a statute constitutes class legislation when it
imposes a burden on some persons but not on others. 35 The court
reasoned that because section 6-08-16.2 imposed the burden of
criminal prosecution upon indigents and did not impose criminal
prosecution upon others, section 6-08-16.2 created class
legislation. 36
Next, the court in Carpenter addressed the issue of the
30. Fischer, 349 N.W.2d at 18. The court found that the payment defense language created an
impermissible wealth classification regardless of where it was located. Id.
31. Id. The court agreed with the trial judge's analysis of the similarities and differences between
$ 6-08-16.2 and 6-08-16 of the North Dakota Century Code. Id. For the trial judge's analysis, see
supra note 6.
32. Fischer, 349 N.W.2d at 18.
33. See supra notes 31, 32 and accompanying text.
34. Carpenter, 301 N.W.2d at 109. The court in Carpenter determined that § 6-08-16.2 created a
classification based on indigency. Id.
35. Id. To determine whether § 6-08-16.2 constituted class legislation, the court in Carpenter
relied upon its previous decision in Hospital Servs. Inc. v. Brooks, 229 N.W.2d 69 (N.D. 1975). Id.
In Brooks the North Dakota Supreme Court, noting that the proper scope of inquiry was whether the
statute constituted an impermissible classification or invidious discrimination, stated as follows:
Sections II and 20 of the North Dakota Constitution and § I of the fourteenth
amendment to the United States Constitution do not prohibit or prevent classification,
provided such classification is reasonable for the purpose of legislation, is based otl
proper and justifiable distinctions considering the purpose of the law, is not clearly
arbitrary, and is not a subterfuge to shield one class or to burden another or to oppress
unlawfully in its administration.
Hospital Servs. Inc. v. Brooks, 229 N.W.2d 69, 72 (N.D. 1975) (quoting In re Estate ofJensen, 162
N.W.2d 861,877 (N.D. 1968)).
The court in Brooks declined to decide the equal protection issue under the equal protection
clause of the United States Constitution; instead the court found a denial of equal protection under
§§ 11 and 20 of the North Dakota State Constitution. Brooks, 229 N.W.2d at 72. Although not
decided under the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment, the court in Brooks
considered the factors quoted above relevant in determining the permissibility of classifications
under the fourteenth amendment. Id.
36. Carpenter, 301 N.W.2d at 109.
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appropriate level of scrutiny for judicial review of wealth
classifications.3 7 The court recognized that the United States
Supreme Court has not declared wealth classifications suspect, but
noted that the possibility for such a declaration does exist. 38 The
court determined that although indigency alone was not a suspect
classification, the combination of the wealth classification and
criminal sanctions warranted an intermediate standard of review. 39
In applying the intermediate standard of review, 40 the court in
Carpenter determined that although the state had an important
interest in preventing the issuance of insufficient-fund checks, no
substantial relationship existed between that state interest and the
classification based upon the ability of a defendant to pay for an
affirmative defense to criminal prosecution. 41 The court in Carpenter
then held that the classification contained in section 6-08-16.2
amounted to a denial of equal protection and was therefore
unconstitutional. 42  The court in Fischer found the statutory
language before it substantively the same as that in Carpenter, and,
based on that similarity, reached the same conclusion as it had in
Carpenter. 43
37. Id. In addressing this issue, the court looked to decisions uf the United States Supreme
Court in order to find a clear test to be used in determining whether a wealth classification was either
a suspect classification or involved a fundamental interest, thereby invoking strict scrutiny under
equal protection analysis. Id. Finding no clear test readily available, the court noted the following
!tctors that the United States Supreme Court has found important in making this determination:
"imnmitable and highly visible characteristics," "historical disadvantage," and "relative lack of
political representation." Id.
38. Id. For discussion of the United States Supreme Court's decisions dealing with wealth as a
suspect classification, see supra notes 16-22 and accompanying text.
39. Carpenter, 301 N.W.2d at 110. In reaching this conclusion the court stated that such a
result was "required by the nature of the interest of [the] defendant." Id. The court's
rationale on this point is not fully advanced by the text of the opinton. It is apparent, however, that
the court found the importance of a "criminal statute," "criminal prosecution," and a "felony"
involved in Carpenter sufficient to justify a standard of review greater than the rational basis standard.
Id. Perhaps this classification was deserving of a higher level of scrutiny than rational-basis scrutiny
because a non-suspect wealth classification was coupled with the fundamental "right to a fair trial. "
Cf Wilkinson, The Supreme Court, the Equal Protection Clause and the Three Faces of Constitutional Equality,
61 VA. L. REV. 945, 1003 & n.282 (1975) (examining the United States Supreme Court's treatment
ifwealth classifications in the context of the criminal appeal).
40. See supra notes 16, 18, and 39 and accompanying text. Although the preceding discussion in
notes 16, 18, 39 and the accompanying text suggests that the court in Carpenter could have used strict
scrutiny to require the government to show that the classification in § 6-08-16.2 was "necessary" to
promote a "compelling" state interest, the court's choice of an intermediate standard of review is not
unsupported by language from the United States Supreme Court. In Harper v. Virginia Bd. of
Elections, the United States Supreme Court stated that "[l]ines drawn on the basis of wealth or
property . ..are traditionally disfavored. " Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 668
(1966) (citations omitted) (emphasis added). Ten years later in Craig v. Boren, the Court introduced
its "intermediate level" of equal protection analysis for classifications made on the basis of gender.
See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976). In objecting to the introduction of that standard of review,
Chief Justice Burger stated: "Though today's decision does not go as far as to make gender-based
classifications 'suspect,' it makes gender a disfavored classification." Id. at 217 (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting) (emphasis added). By reading Chief Justice Burger's comment and the passage from
Harper together, two things are apparent: (1) wealth classifications are disfavored and (2) disfavored
classifications are subject to an intermediate standard of review under equal protection analysis.
41. Carpenter, 301 N.W.2d at 110.
42. Id.
43. Fischer, 349 N.W.2d at 18.
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After finding the affirmative defense language of section 6-08-
16 unconstitutional, the court in Fischer examined the
constitutionally offensive language to determine whether it could be
severed from the statute while allowing the remainder of section 6-
08-16 to remain in effect.44 The court ruled that because the
affirmative defense language ameliorated the otherwise harsh result
of the strict liability crime created by section 6-08-16, it constituted
such an important and integral part of that section that the
legislature would not have intended the statute to stand without
it. - Therefore, the court held that section 6-08-16 was
unconstitutional and invalid in its entirety.4 6
In the interim between the Fischer decision and the completion
of this case comment, the North Dakota Supreme Court has had
an opportunity to further clarify the Fischer decision.4 7 In State v.
Clark48 the state appealed from a county court judge's sua sponte
dismissal of a criminal complaint charging the defendant with
violating section 6-08-16. 4 9 The court held that, although the effect
of the Fischer decision was to render the 1983 version of section 6-
08-16 unconstitutional, the Fischer decision did not create a
prosecutorial void under that section.5 0  Rather, the court
determined that the version of section 6-08-16 which existed prior
to the addition of the unconstitutional language remained in full
force and effect after the Fischer decision, and that persons could be
44. Id.
45. Id. The manner in which the court is to determine the severability of infirm language is
found in § 1-02-20 of the North Dakota Century Code, which provides as follows:
In the event that any clause, sentence, paragraph, chapter, or other part of any
title, shall be adjudged by any court of competent or final jurisdiction to be invalid,
such judgment shall not affect, impair, nor invalidate any other clause, sentence,
paragraph, chapter, section or part of such title, but shall be confined in its operation
to the clause, sentence, paragraph, section, or part thereof directly involved in the
controversy in which suchjudgment shall have been rendered.
N.D. CFNT. CODE § 1-02-20 (1975). The court has stated, however, that "Ithe question as to
whether portions of a statute which are constitutional shall be upheld and given effect, even though
portions of the law are struck down as unconstitutional, involves primarily the ascertainment of the
intention of the Legislature." Montana Dakota Util. Co. v. Johanneson, 153 N.W.2d 414, 424
(N.D. 1967).
46. Fischer, 349 N.W.2d at 18.
47. See, State v. Clark 367 N.W.2d 168 (N.D. 1985). In Clark the court addressed the issue of
whether the Fischer decision effectively decriminalized the issuance of nonsufficient lund checks. Id.
at 168.
48. 367 N.W.2d 168 (N.D. 1985).
49. Id. at 168. The judge dismissed the complaint based upon Fischer, which had declared § 6-
08-16 unconstitutional. Id.
50. Id. at 169. The court reasoned that under existing case law, the well-established rule is that
unconstitutional legislation is void and is to be treated as if it had never been enacted. Id. The court
further reasoned that when legislation repealing, amending, or modifying an existing statute is
declared unconstitutional, the legislation is a nullity and cannot affect the existing statute in any way.
Id. Instead, the court concluded that the existing statute remains in effect notwithstanding the
unsuccessful and invalid attempt to repeal, amend, or modify it. Id.
138 [VOL. 61:131
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charged thereunder. 51
The North Dakota State Legislature also acted to remedy the
constitutional infirmity existing in section 6-08-16.52 In 1985,
House Bill 1072, which eliminated the payment defense language
of section 6-08-16 ruled unconstitutional in Fischer, was passed and
51. Id. In. applyingthe law to the facts in Clark, the court noted that the 1983 amendments to 5 6-
08-16 did not repeal, but rather amended and reenacted the 1981 version of S 6-08-16 by adding the
unconstitutional payment defense language. Id. See Nonsufficient Fund Check Issuance Act, ch. 116,
S1, 1983 N.D. Sess. Laws 296, 296-98 (current version to be codified at N.D. CENT. CODE S 6-08-16
(Supp. 1985)). For portions of the relevant text of § 6-08-16 as it existed after the 1983 amendment,
see supra note 3. Prior to this 1983 amendment, § 6-08-16 existed as amended and reenacted by the
Nonsufficient Fund Check Collection Act, ch. 120, S 1, 1981 N.D. Sess. Laws 266, 266-67 (current
version to be codified at N.D. CENT. CODE § 6-08-16 (Supp. 1985)). This act provided in pertinent
part as follows:
1. Any person who for himself or as the agent or representative of another, or as
an officer or member of a firm, company, copartnership, or corporation makes, draws,
utters, or delivers any check, draft, or order for the payment of money upon a bank,
banker, or depository, and at the time of such making, drawing, uttering, or delivery,
or at the time of presentation for payment if made within one week after the original
delivery thereof, has not sufficient funds in or credit with such bank, banker, or
depository to meet such check, draft, or order in full upon its presentation, is guilty of
a class B misdemeanor....
2. A notice of dishonor may be sent by the holder of the check upon dishonor, the
notice to be in substantially the following form:
Notice of Dishonored Check
Date
Name of Issuer
Street Address
City and State
You are according to law hereby notified that a check dated
19 -, drawn on the Bank
of -_ in the amount of has been
returned unpaid with the notation the payment has been refused because of
nonsufficient funds. Within ten days from the receipt of this notice, you must pay or
tender to
(Holder)
sufficient moneys to pay such instrument in full and any collection fees or costs not in
excess often dollars.
An agent acting for the receiver of a check in violation of this section may present
the check to the state's attorney for prosecution if the issuer does not pay to the holder
sufficient moneys to pay the check within ten days from receipt of the notice. The
criminal complaint for the offense of issuing a check, draft, or money order without
sufficient funds under this section must be executed within not more than ninety days
after the dishonor by the drawee of said instrument for nonsufficient funds. The failure
to execute a complaint within said time shall bar the criminal charge under this
section.
Nonsufficient Fund Check Collection Act, ch. 120, fI, 1981 N.D. Sess. Laws 266, 266-67 (current
version to be codified at N.D. CENT. CODE S 6-08-16 (Supp. 1985)).
Since the 1983 amendments merely added the payment defense language to the 1981 version of
6-08-16 without repealing it, the court concluded that the effect of the unconstitutionality of the
inseverable 1983 amendments was to render the 1983 version of S 6-08-16 a nullity, thus treating the
1983 amendments as if they had never been enacted. Clark, 367 N.W.2d at 169. Consequently, the
court determined that the effect of the Fischer decision was that the 1981 statute, as it existed prior to
the 1983 amendments, was left intact until its valid repeal or amendment. Id.
The court had previously examined the 1981 version of § 6-08-16 and found it constitutional in
State v. Mathisen, 356 N.W.2d 129 (N.D. 1984). Clark, 367 N.W.2d at 169. Therefore, the court
concluded that the 1981 version of 5 6-08-16 remained in full force and effect and held that Clark
could be charged with violating the 1981 version of § 6-08-16. Id.
52. See Dishonored Checks Act, ch. 127, 5 1, 1985 N.D. Sess. Laws 272 (to be codified at N.D.
CENT. CODE § 6-08-16 (Supp. 1985)).
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Initially, the Fischer decision may have caused uncertainty reg-
arding the status of North Dakota's "bad check" law. However,
later cases before the North Dakota Supreme Court and the actions
of the 1985 North Dakota Legislature have clearly delineated North
Dakota's long established policy of proscribing the issuance of
checks without sufficient funds.
TIMOTHY R. DITTUS
53. Id. The Dishonored Checks Act amended § 6-08-16 to provide as follows:
6-08-16. Issuing check or draft without sufficient funds or credit - Notice -Time limitation -
Financial liability - Penalty.
I. A person may not, for himself, as the agent or representative of another, or as an
officer or member of a firm, company, copartnership, or corporation make, draw,
utter, or deliver any check, draft, or order for the payment of money upon a bank,
banker, or depository, if at the time of such making, drawing, uttering, or
delivery, or at the time of presentation for payment if made within one week after
the original delivery thereof, there are not sufficient funds in or credit with the
bank, banker, or depository to meet the check, draft, or order in full upon its
presentation. Violation of this subsection is a class B misdemeanor.
2. The person is also liable for collection fees or costs, not in excess of ten dollars,
which are recoverable by civil action by the holder of the check, draft, or order. A
civil penalty is also recoverable by civil action by the holder of the check, draft, or
order. The civil penalty consists of payment to the holder of the instrument of the
lesser of one hundred dollars or three times the amount of the instrument.
3. The word "credit" as used in this section means an arrangement or understanding
with the bank, banker, or depository for the paytaent of the check, draft, or order.
The making of a postdated check knowingly received as such, or of a check issued
under an agreement with the payee that the check would not be presented for
payment for a time specified, does not violate this section.
4. A notice of dishonor may be mailed by the holder of the check upon dishonor.
Proof of mailing may be made by return receipt or by an affidavit of iailing signed
by the individual making the mailing. The notice must be in substantially the
fbllowing form:
Notice of Dishonored Check
Date
Name of Issuer
Street Address
City and State
You are according to law hereby notified that a check dated
19-, drawn on the Bank
of, in the amount of has been
returned unpaid with the notation the payment has been refused because of
nonsufficient funds. Within ten days from the receipt of this notice, you must pay
or tender to
(Holder)
sufficient moneys to pay such instrument in full and any collection fees or costs not
in excess often dollars.
The notice may also contain a recital of the penal provisions of this section and the
possibility of a civil action to recover any collection fees or costs or civil penalty
authorized by this section.
5. An agent acting for the receiver of a check in violation of this section may present
the check to the state's attorney for prosecution. The criminal complaint for the
offense of issuing a check, draft, or money order without sufficient funds under this
section must be executed within not more than ninety days after the dishonor by
the drawee of said instrument for nonsufficient funds. The failure to execute a
complaint within said time bars the criminal charge under this section.
